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Abstract
Following highly divergent approaches taken by judges in the Peris› ic¤ , Taylor and
S› ainovic¤ judgments, the dispute over the application of the standard of ‘specific dir-
ection’ as an element of actus reus of aiding and abetting liability appears to have
been settled within the subsequent jurisprudence of the ad hoc international crim-
inal tribunals. Yet the various legal issues raised by the judgments continue to vex:
viewing this particular line of cases as mere instances of ‘fragmentation’of interna-
tional criminal law (ICL) would be a superficial exercise. After discussing the
notion of ‘fragmentation’ and the value of using the metaphor in the context of ICL,
the author turns to substantive criminal law to try and determine the correct
actus reus of aiding and abetting liability in contemporary ICL, and to ask whether
‘specific direction’ has any role to play therein. He then addresses the more general
problem of determining the role of coherence and consistency in the development of
ICL, the function of precedents within and across international courts and tribunals,
and the evolving role and function of customary international law in contemporary
ICL to draw lessons for the International Criminal Court.
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1. Introduction
In less than a year, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) reached two opposite conclusions
on the same legal issue. In Peris› ic¤ (judgment of 28 February 2013),1 it held
that ‘specific direction’ is a constitutive element of the actus reus of ‘aiding and
abetting’ liability and that, therefore, a conviction under this mode of liability
could be entered only if it is proven that the conduct of the aider and abettor
is specifically directed to the commission of a crime.2 By contrast, in S› ainovic¤
(judgment of 23 January 2014),3 the ICTY Appeals Chamber (in a partially dif-
ferent composition)4 determined that ‘specific direction’ is not an element of
the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability.5
Amidst this unprecedented jurisprudential U-turn stood the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which in the Taylor case
was required to determine whether or not to adhere to the Peris› ic¤ precedent.6
Under Article 20(3) of the SCSL Statute, which provides that the judges of the
SCSL Appeals Chamber ‘shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals
Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda’, the SCSL Appeals Chamber was entitled (if not required) to adhere
to the Peris› ic¤ precedent.7 However, in a remarkable display of judicial independ-
ence, it chose not to do so. Rather than follow the Peris› ic¤ precedent, the SCSL
1 Judgment, Peris› ic¤ (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011 (‘Peris› ic¤ Trial Judgment’). For
an analysis of the judgment, see N. Koumjian and C. Kenny, ‘Specific Direction: The ICTY’s
‘‘Novel’’Attempt to Regulate State Action’, 8 Irish Yearbook of International Law (2013) 3, at 6;
M.J.Ventura, ‘Farewell ‘Specific Direction’: Aiding and AbettingWar Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity in Peris› ic¤ , Taylor, S› ainovic¤ et al., and US Alien Tort Statute Jurisprudence’, in S.
Casey-Maslen (ed.), TheWar Report: Armed Conflict in 2013 (Oxford University Press, 2014) 511,
at 513^517.
2 Judgment, Peris› ic¤ (IT-04-81-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 February 2013, xx 25^36 (‘Peris› ic¤ Appeal
Judgment’). On 6 September 2011, Peris› ic¤ ç former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav
Army until 1998 ç was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity and sen-
tenced to 27 years imprisonment. Finding that the available evidence was not sufficient to
prove the requirement of ‘specific direction’ on 28 February 2013, the Appeals Chamber
acquitted him of all charges. See Peris› ic¤ Trial Judgment, ibid., xx 45^74.
3 Judgment, S› ainovic¤ et al. (IT-05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014 (‘S› ainovic¤ Appeal
Judgment’).
4 The judges composing the Appeals Chamber in the Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment case were: Meron,
Agius, Liu, Ramarosson, Vaz. The judges composing the Appeals Chamber in the S› ainovic¤
Appeal Judgment were: Liu, Gu« ney, Pocar, Ramarosson, Tuzmukhamedov. Judges Liu and
Ramarosson sat in both cases.
5 S› ainovic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 3, xx1626^1651.
6 Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-A), Appeals Chamber, 26 September 2013 (‘Taylor Appeal
Judgment’).
7 On the notion of precedent, see G. Acquaviva and F. Pocar, ‘Stare Decisis’, in M. Planck (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), available online at
http:www.mpepil.com (visited 16 January 2016). On the role of ‘precedents’ in the field of ICL,
see also A. Zammit Borda, ‘How Do International Judges Approach Competing Precedent? An
Analysis of the Practice of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals in Relation to
Substantive Law’, 15 International Criminal Law Review (ICLR) (2015) 124^146.
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Appeals Chamber backed the SCSL Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the ‘sub-
stantial contribution’ to the commission of a crime by the aider and abettor is
sufficient to establish his criminal responsibility.8 As mentioned above, only a
few months later, the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber came to the same conclusion
and overruled the Peris› ic¤ precedent.
Subsequently, the ICTYAppeals Chamber has upheld the conclusion reached
in S› ainovic¤ concerning specific direction in the cases Popovic¤ et al.9 and
Stanis› ic¤ and Simatovic¤ .10 At this point, therefore, the dispute over the applica-
tion of the standard of ‘specific direction’ within the ICTY jurisprudence ap-
pears to be settled.11 Yet the various legal issues that this line of cases raised
are not. As they affect the application and development of international crim-
inal law (ICL), they require careful consideration. From a substantive criminal
perspective, it needs to be determined what the correct actus reus of aiding
and abetting liability in contemporary ICL should be, and whether the notion
of specific direction has any role to play therein.12 From a more general and
8 Taylor Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, x 481.
9 Judgment, Popovic¤ et al. (IT-05-88-A), Appeals Chamber, 30 January 2015, x 1758 (‘Popovic¤
Appeal Judgment’). The judges sitting in this case were: Robinson, Sekule, Pocar, Ramarosson,
Niang.
10 Judgment, Stanis› ic¤ and Simatovic¤ (IT-03-69-A), Appeals Chamber, 9 December 2015, xx103^107
(‘Stanis› ic¤ and Simatovic¤ Appeal Judgment’). The judges sitting in this case were: Pocar, Agius,
Liu, Ramarosson, Afand~e. Judge Agius and Judge Afand~e appended dissenting opinions. See
‘Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Agius’, xx 6^7 and ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Afand~e’, xx 22^31.
11 See in this regard J.G. Stewart,‘Judicial Rejection of ‘‘Specific Direction’’ IsWidespread’, Blogpost,
23 December 2015, xx 1^4, available online at http://jamesgstewart.com/judicial-rejection-of-
specific-direction-is-widespread/ (visited 16 January 2016). It is a separate question whether the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is binding on the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals (MICT). Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), which set up the MICT, does not
contain a provision on the point. An affirmative answer could be based on x 4 of Resolution
1966, which appears to frame the MICT as the successor of the ICTYand ICTRwhen it provides
that ‘the Mechanism shall continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential func-
tions of the ICTY and the ICTR’. That said, the absence in the statute of the MICT of a specific
provision dedicated to the relevance of the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence for the MICT would
probably make it necessary for a MICT Chamber to articulate the reason(s) for adhering (or
not) to the jurisprudence of its predecessor.
12 This article does not take a position on the substantive question of whether ‘specific direction’
or ‘substantial contribution’ should be the correct standard for aiding and abetting liability in
ICL. See on this issue the dissenting opinion of Judge K.K.A. Afand~e appended to the Stanis› ic¤
and Simatovic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 10, xx 22^31. For scholarly analyses, see J. Trahan
and E.K. Lovall, ‘The ICTY Appellate Chamber’s Acquittal of Momc› ilo Peris› ic¤ : The Specific
Direction Element of Aiding and Abetting Should Be Rejected or Modified to Explicitly Include
a ‘‘Reasonable Person’’ Due Diligence Standard’, 40 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2014)
172^206; L.N. Sadat, ‘Can the ICTY S›ainovic¤ and Peris› ic¤ Cases Be Reconciled?’, 108 American
Journal of International Law (2014) 475, 485; A. Coco and T. Gal, ‘Losing Direction: The ICTY
Appeals Chamber’s Controversial Approach to Aiding and Abetting in Peris› ic¤ ’, 12 Journal of
International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2014) 345^366; Koumjian and Kenny, supra note 1, at 22;
M. Aksenova, ‘The Specific Direction Requirement for Aiding and Abetting: A Call for
Revisiting Comparative Criminal Law’, 4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2015) 88, at 103^106; and Ventura, supra note 1, at 525^553.
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theoretical perspective, the problem arises of determining the role of coherence
and consistency in the development of ICL;13 the function of precedents
within and across international courts and tribunals;14 and the evolving role
and function of customary international law (CIL) in contemporary ICL, par-
ticularly given the consolidation of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC)
regime.15 It is to the analysis of this second set of issues that this article hopes
to contribute.
The fluctuating jurisprudence in the Peris› ic¤ , Taylor and S› ainovic¤ judgments
ç which could have been even more puzzling had the SCSL Appeals
Chamber embraced the soon-to-be overturned Peris› ic¤ precedent ç unveils a
rather alarming truth. More than 20 years after the establishment of the
ICTYand the ICTR, and more than 10 years since the coming into force of the
ICC Statute and the establishment of the SCSL (2002), there are norms of ICL
the content of which appears uncertain and volatile, notwithstanding their
frequent application.16 This diverging jurisprudence is not the result of differ-
ently worded provisions in the texts of the Statutes of different courts, which
The matter has also been discussed, from various perspectives and touching different issues,
in the blogosphere. See, among others, K.J. Heller, ‘More Misdirection on Specific Direction’,
Opinio Juris, 13 August 2013, available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/13/yet-more-spe-
cific-direction-misdirection/ (visited 16 January 2016) and by the same author, ‘Why the
ICTY’s ‘‘Specifically Directed’’ Requirement is Justified’, Opinio Juris, 2 June 2013 available
online at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys-specifically-directed-requirement-is-
justified/ (visited 13 January 2016); J. Stewart, ‘ ‘‘Specific Direction’’ is Unprecedented: Results
from Two Empirical Studies’, EJIL: Talk!, 4 September 2013, available online at http://www.ejil-
talk.org/specific-direction-is-unprecedented-results-from-two-empirical-studies/ (visited 16
January 2016) and also by the same author, ‘ ‘‘Specific Direction’’ is Indefensible: A Response to
Heller on Complicity’, Opinio Juris, 12 June 2013, available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/
06/12/specific-direction-is-indefensible-a-response-to-heller-on-complicity/ (visited 16 January
2016); J.D. Ohlin, ‘Specific Direction Again’, Opinio Juris, 17 December 2015, available online at
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/12/17/specific-direction-again/ (visited 16 January 2016).
13 See G. Acquaviva, ‘Aiding and Abetting International Crimes and the Value of Judicial
Consistency: Reflections Prompted by the Perisic, Taylor and Sainovic Verdicts’, 3 Questions of
International Law (QIL) (2014) 3^21; J.N. Clark, ‘ ‘‘Specific Direction’’ and the Fragmentation of
International Jurisprudence on Aiding and Abetting: Peris› ic¤ and Beyond’, 15 ICLR (2015)
411^451. In the blogosphere see, among others, M. Milanovic, ‘The Self-Fragmentation of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber’, EJIL: Talk!, 23 January 2014, available online at http://www.ejiltalk.
org/the-self-fragmentation-of-the-icty-appeals-chamber/ (visited 13 January 2016).
14 See, generally, Zammit Borda, supra note 7.
15 On this matter, see D. Jacobs, ‘The Mythical Unities of International Criminal Law: Some
Thoughts on Peris› ic¤ ,Taylor and Sainovic’, 3 QIL (2014) 23, 29^31; L. van den Herik, ‘The Decline
of Customary International Law as a Source of International Criminal Law’, in C. Bradley (ed.),
Custom’s Future: International Law in a Changing World (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
230^252.
16 The uncertainty of the Appeals Chamber is made evident by Judges Meron and Agius’s Separate
Opinion, when, rather openly, they state: ‘Accordingly, were we setting out the elements of
aiding and abetting outside the context of the Tribunal’s past jurisprudence, we would consider
categorising specific direction as an element of mens rea. However, we are satisfied that specific
direction can also, as the Appeal Judgement’s analysis demonstrates, be reasonably assessed in
the context of actus reus.’ See the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel
Agius in Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 1, x 4.
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were, in fact, the same. Rather, as discussed below, it reflects methodological
and interpretative differences over the ascertainment of the content of the ap-
plicable law between differently composed judicial benches.17
One could argue that normative conflicts are part of the physiology of inter-
national criminal justice, given that ‘even within well-structured and hierarch-
ized domestic systems, there are often discrepancies in the interpretation of
the law between appeal chambers or even between different decisions of the
Supreme Court’.18 However, the discrepancies at hand extend beyond ‘business
as usual’. Nor do they concern an uncharted area of ICL, where disagreements
may occur as a matter of course due to the novelty of an issue. These disagree-
ments pertain to the core issues of everyday international criminal justice ç
the definition of a constitutive element of a mode of liability routinely
employed to convict international offenders. Therefore, they cast a shadow
over the credibility of international criminal justice as a normative regime at
a time when such credibility is most needed.19
These discrepancies may be attributed to the limits of an unwritten and
under-inclusive ICL based on CIL, which could be tackled through codification,
such as the ICC Statute has sought to do.20 As codification is difficult to
achieve, however, leaving the clarification of the applicable law to this means
alone is insufficient. It falls on judges, as part of their duty to exercise the judi-
cial function fairly and effectively, to ensure a reasonable degree of stability
and predictability in the application and development of ICL.
Upon review of the approaches followed by the judges in the Peris› ic¤ , Taylor
and S› ainovic¤ judgments, this article argues that viewing these cases as mere
instances of ‘fragmentation’ may be a superficial exercise. Among these cases,
in fact, the Taylor and S› ainovic¤ judgments are to be singled out as they sought
to rein in diverging streams of jurisprudence in order to achieve a reasonable
degree of stability and predictability in the context of the applied law. After dis-
cussing the notion of ‘fragmentation’and the value of using the fragmentation
metaphor in the context of ICL, this article enquires as to what could be
learnt from these cases in terms of countering fragmentation, specifically
whether CIL can be a tool for limiting fragmentation within ICL.
17 Art. 6(1) SCSLSt. (individual criminal responsibility) reads: ‘1. A person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution
of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible
for the crime’. Art. 7(1) ICTYSt. (individual criminal responsibility) provides ‘1. A person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, prep-
aration or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be indi-
vidually responsible for the crime’.
18 Jacobs, supra note 15, at 37.
19 According to L. Sadat, ‘International criminal justice is in its infancy and is not yet accepted as
either useful or relevant by many, not just the defendants being tried. Powerful governments,
distinguished scholars, and learned jurists have forcefully and persistently argued that interna-
tional criminal justice is neither legitimate nor appropriate as a response to mass atrocities.’
Sadat, supra note 12, at 485.
20 Jacobs, supra note 15, 27^33.
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2. The Concept of ‘Fragmentation’ in the Field of ICL
The noun ‘fragmentation’ refers to the ‘action of breaking something into frag-
ments’.21 In the field of international law, this term has been used in connection
with two trends seen as dangerous by advocates of the unity of international
law: the emergence of self-contained regimes and the proliferation of interna-
tional courts and tribunals.22
Albeit part of international law, ICL is a distinct legal regime with its own as-
pirations and exigencies. Hence, the term ‘fragmentation’ should not be under-
stood within the regime of ICL in the same way as in the system of
international law writ large. In the field of ICL, the term ‘fragmentation’ may
be useful from a descriptive, if not a metaphoric, perspective to draw attention
to processes that could make ICL less clear than it should be. That term has,
in fact, enough depth to convey the sense of precariousness, or of broken ex-
pectations, that result when the content of the applicable law ç which is ex-
pected, as a condicio sine qua non for its existence and authority, to be
reasonably clear and predictable ç becomes blurred. A blurred law is unable
to do what is expected: to provide guidance to those it addresses.
It would be inaccurate, however, to use the term ‘fragmentation’ to imply the
breaking of a unity that ICL never had.23 ICL is a pluralist legal regime24 result-
ing from the unsystematic conflation of norms originating from public interna-
tional law (and its various branches, such as international humanitarian and
human rights law) and domestic criminal laws.25 The terminology of fragmen-
tation, however, can still serve a useful purpose in such a pluralist regime. In
fact, pluralism, as noted by Elies van Sliedregt, does imply and require a cer-
tain degree of ‘commonness’.26 Remove something that glues together a plural-
ist regime and it would remain ‘pluralist’, but it would stop being a ‘regime’ as
there would be nothing regimenting it.What appears to be gluing ICL together
21 See the entry ‘Fragmentation’, in Shorter Oxford Dictionary English Dictionary, Vol. I (5th edn.,
Oxford University Press, 2012), at 1026.
22 See, in particular, C. Stahn and L. van den Herik,‘Fragmentation, Diversification and ‘‘3D’’ Legal
Pluralism: International Criminal Law as the Jack-In-The Box’, in C. Stahn and L. van den
Herik (eds), The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 21, 56; see also, among others, T. Treves, ‘Fragmentation of
International Law: The Judicial Perspective’, 27 Agenda Internacional (2009) 213, 214; R.
Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Rumination from the Bench’, in R. Higgins (ed.),Themes and
Theories (Oxford University Press, 2009) 1255^1256; and G. Gaja, ‘Relationship of the ICJ with
Other International Courts and Tribunals’, in A. Zimmerman et al. (eds), The Statute of the
International Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012), at 533.
23 E. van Sliedregt and S.Vasiliev,‘Pluralism: A New Framework for International Criminal Justice’,
in E. van Sliedregt and S. Vasiliev (eds), Pluralism in International Criminal Law (Oxford
University Press, 2014) 3, 16.
24 Ibid., at 15^20.
25 Ibid.; see also C. Steer, ‘Legal Transplants or Legal Patchworking? The Creation of International
Criminal Law as a Pluralistic Body of Law’, in van Sliedregt and Vasiliev (eds), supra note 23, at
55^56.
26 E. van Sliedregt, ‘Pluralism in International Criminal Law’, 25 Leiden Journal of International Law
(LJIL) (2012) 847, at 851.
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and justifying its growth is the shared aspiration of the international commu-
nity of states ç though with varying degrees of commitment ç to ensure the
effective and fair prosecution of international crimes.27
It is this ‘commonness’ that needs to be protected against fragmentation
through appropriate mechanisms. Fragmentation stands in the way of achiev-
ing that aspiration, as it could make the applicable law less stable and predict-
able than it should be. Such stability and predictability is necessary to ensure
that: (i) the parties ç especially accused ç are informed of the content of the
applicable law so that they can adequately prepare; and that (ii) like cases are
treated alike, so that the guilt or innocence of an individual does not depend
on the identity of the judges before whom one happens to stand accused.28
Moreover, it is only by being reasonably predictable and stable (though not ne-
cessarily static) that ICL can act as a deterrent for future offenders and provide
guidance to national courts that are required to apply customary ICL.
Asserting the need for a stable and predictable ICL is not to ask for full uni-
formity in its doctrine and practice. Not only are there differences between
international and domestic jurisdictions, but the plurality of international judi-
cial institutions operating within the field of international criminal justice is
also an opportunity for cross-fertilization and a space for the debate and con-
testation of different views.29 That said, caution is necessary. If those called to
administer ICL do not appreciate the importance of a coherent normative
regime and search for it through appropriate choices and techniques, then
the risk that, because of fragmentation, ICL’s healthy and dynamic pluralism
27 R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal and Procedure (3rd edn., Cambridge
University Press, 2014), at 28^46.
28 Judgment, Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-A), Appeals Chamber 24 March 2000, xx 104^107 (‘Aleksovski
Appeal Judgment’). In xx104, 105 and 107 of this judgment, the ICTYAppeals Chamber stated:
104. The right of appeal is a component of the fair trial requirement set out in Article 14
of the ICCPR, and Article 21(4) of the Statute. The right to a fair trial is, of course, a re-
quirement of customary international law.
105. An aspect of the fair trial requirement is the right of an accused to have like cases treated
alike, so that in general, the same cases will be treated in the same way and decided as
Judge Tanaka said, ‘possibly by the same reasoning’ [emphasis added].
107. The Appeals Chamber, therefore, concludes that a proper construction of the
Statute, taking due account of its text and purpose, yields the conclusion that in the
interests of certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous
decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of
justice [emphasis added].
29 For an outline of the benefits of a pluralist international law, see N. Krisch, Beyond
Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 69^89. To be precise, Krisch’s analysis does
not discuss ICL; however, I believe that some of the arguments he develops on the advantages
of a pluralist international law can, mutatis mutandis, be pertinent also with regard to the
regime of ICL.
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will be replaced by particularism, if not anarchy, is at its zenith.30 The worri-
some scenario of fragmentation may occur (i) in the practice of a single judicial
body, as it would blur the content of the applicable law and impede the forma-
tion of a reasonably clear and coherent body of jurisprudence; and (ii) across
different courts and tribunals whenever they apply the same norms of ICL.
True, there is no rule of international precedent, whereby one tribunal is
required to adhere to the holdings of law or fact of another tribunal. Moreover,
each international tribunal is required to apply primarily its Statute, the content
of which differs from one tribunal to another. Nevertheless, there may be in-
stances in which different courts or tribunals are to apply the same norms be-
cause they face the same or similar factual scenario. This may happen when
the wording in their Statutes happens to be identical, such as in the cases
under examination here. It may also occur when different courts and tribunals
have to turn ç in the absence of specific provisions in their Statutes ç to the
same body of law, such as CIL on matters of human rights and international hu-
manitarian law and on issues of general international law. Without expecting
absolute uniformity of interpretations, I believe that in such scenarios the legit-
imate quest for change, development and refinement of the applicable law
should be accompanied (and hence balanced) by judicial caution31 and re-
straint32 to ensure a coherent application and development of ICL: in other
words, to ensure that ICL is one law only and not many.
30 Giovanni Tarello, an Italian scholar of the history of modern law, spoke of particolarismo giuri-
dico (juridical particularism) to indicate the lack of unity and coherence of the applicable law
in a given spatial^temporal framework where one would expect to find unity and coherence
of the applicable law. In using this expression,Tarello was describing the situation that existed
for centuries in several European countries before the advent of the penal and civil law codes.
However, I submit that this characterization is also pertinent to illustrate the perils associated
with processes of fragmentation in a contemporary perspective, and particularly in the field of
ICL. G. Tarello, Storia della cultura giuridica moderna (Il Mulino, 1976), at 29.
31 On the concept of ‘judicial caution’, see H. Lauterpacht,The Development of International Law by
the International Court (Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1958), at 75^84.
32 An example of judicial restraint can be found in Judge Shahabuddeen’s Declaration appended to
Oric¤ (Judgment (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2008), especially at xx13^15. Faced with
the question of whether to agree to reverse the interlocutory appeal decision of the Appeals
Chamber in the Hadz› ihasanovic¤ case (16 July 2003) in that part that, under Art. 7(3) ICTYSt.,
had denied the responsibility of a commander for the conduct of his subordinates prior to his
assumption of office, the learned judge refrained from doing so even though he had expressly
dissented from the conclusion of the majority of the Appeals Chamber in that case. He dis-
sented, considering that ‘A decision to reverse turns upon more than theoretical correctness; it
turns upon larger principles concerning the maintenance of the jurisprudence, judicial secur-
ity and predictability. Included in those principles is, I believe, a practice for a judge to observe
restraint in upholding his own dissent.’ He added: ‘Thus, I do not assert that a dissenting judge
can never form part of a subsequent majority upholding his earlier dissent, but I think that
the preferred lesson of the cases is that he is expected to do so with economy’. He came to the
following conclusion: ‘Since I was one of the two dissenting judges in the earlier case (the
other has since demitted office in the ICTY), I consider that, in the circumstances of the present
case, a reversal should await such time when a more solid majority shares the views of those
two judges. Meanwhile, the decision in Hadz› ihasanovic¤ continues to stand as part of the law of
the Tribunal.’
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3. Prompting Fragmentation:The Peris› ic¤ Appeal
Judgment
The Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber purported to follow theTadic¤ Appeal Judgment of 15
July 199933 in finding that the assistance provided by the aider and abettor had
to be ‘specifically’directed to the commission of one or more crimes, rather than
merely connected to them ‘in some way’.34 In doing so, it presented the Tadic¤
Appeal Judgment as a‘well-settled precedent’ that indicated that ‘specific direction
is a necessary element of aiding and abetting liability’.35 The overall effort of the
Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber to treat the jurisprudence of the ICTY as consistent is
unconvincing, however, as diverging approaches had emerged over the years.
Although recognizing that ‘certain appeal judgements rendered after the
Tadic¤ Appeal Judgement made no explicit reference to specific direction’, the
Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber opined that some of these judgments had nonetheless
used ‘alternative but equivalent formulations’ to that of ‘specific direction’.36
The Appeals Chamber also asserted that ‘no judgment of the Appeals
Chamber has found cogent reasons to depart from the definition of ‘‘aiding
and abetting liability’’ adopted in the Tadic¤ Appeal Judgement’,37 but it ques-
tioned the persuasiveness of other judgments merely on the basis that they
had taken different approaches. Thus with regard to the Mrks› ic¤ and
S› ljivanc› anin Appeal Judgment, the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber stated that this
judgment had erroneously departed from settled jurisprudence when ‘stating
that specific direction is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abet-
ting’.38 It remarked ç rather pointedly ç that, even if it is correct to say that
the Mrks› ic¤ and S› ljivanc› anin Appeal Judgment had taken a different approach
from the Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment, this did not reflect an ‘intention to depart
33 InTadic¤ (Judgment (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999 (‘Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment’) x 229),
the ICTYAppeals Chamber stated:
In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish between acting in
pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting. (i)
The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person,
the principal. (ii) In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence
of a common concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No plan or
agreement is required: indeed, the principal may not even know about the accomplice’s
contribution. (iii) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encour-
age or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermin-
ation, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has
a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in the case of
acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design, it is sufficient for the participant
to perform acts that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or
purpose [emphasis added].
34 Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 1, x 27.
35 Ibid., x 41.
36 Ibid., x 29.
37 Ibid., x 28.
38 Ibid., x 32.
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from the settled precedent established by the Tadic¤ Appeal Judgement’.39 But
what was for the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber to assess, it may be suggested, was
not the intention of the ICTY Mrks› ic¤ and S› ljivanc› anin Appeals Chamber, but
the more concrete question of whether this latter judgment had, in fact, de-
parted from the Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment and if this departure was erroneous or
not. If such a departure had occurred and if it was erroneous, it fell on the
Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber to explain why it was so in order to validate its rea-
soning and conclusions.
Further, the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber’s reliance on theTadic¤ Appeal Judgment
for the adoption of ‘specific direction’ was flawed by what James Stewart aptly
calls ‘a misreading of casual language in Tadic’.40 The Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber
adhered uncritically to the conclusion reached in that judgment without dis-
cussing the ratio decidendi underlying it, which was, in fact, missing. This cir-
cumstance should have cautioned the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber against
embracing that ‘precedent’. Nor did the Appeals Chamber contemplate the pos-
sibility that the holding in Tadic¤ could be a mere obiter dictum ç as it was ç
made in passim in the context of a section of the judgment exclusively con-
cerned with defining and setting the boundaries of the mode of liability of
joint criminal enterprise. In short, it took out of context a dictum of the
Appeals Chamber and conferred the status of leading precedent to a section
of a judgment that did not enjoy it (as the differing attitude towards it of other
Chambers ç both at trial and in appeal ç had made evident). Moreover, by
questioning the persuasiveness of other judgments rendered by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber merely on the basis that they had taken a different approach,
the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber entrenched existing divisions within the ICTY
practice, missing an opportunity to unite its jurisprudence under a common
denominator. Due in part to these flaws, the Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment was not
followed by other courts and was quickly reversed.
4. Preventing Fragmentation: the TaylorAppeal
Judgment
While acknowledging the requirement contained in Article 20(3) of its Statute
that it be ‘guided by’ the decisions of the ICTR and ICTYAppeals Chamber, the
SCSL Appeals Chamber took the view that when ‘applying the Statute and cus-
tomary international law’, it is itself the ‘final arbiter of the law for this
39 Ibid. Moreover, as Manuel Ventura has observed, the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber did not discuss
the fact that another bench of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Lukic¤ and Lukic¤ (judgment of 4
December 2012) had adhered to the Mrks› ic¤ and S› ljivanc› anin Appeal Judgment in stating that
‘specific direction is not an essential element of aiding and abetting liability’. Ventura, supra
note 1, at 518.
40 Stewart, supra note 11, at 2. For Jens Ohlin, the reasoning of the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber
amounts to a ‘house of cards built upon a strained reading of three words that were originally
drafted, as dicta, in the original Tadic opinion’. Ohlin, supra note 12.
780 JICJ 14 (2016), 771^792
 by guest on O
ctober 28, 2016
http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Court’41 and that, therefore, ‘decisions of other courts are only persuasive, not
binding, authority’.42 By so reasoning,43 the SCSL Appeals Chamber was able
to bypass Article 20(3), to depart from the precedent set in the Peris› ic¤ Appeal
Judgment, and to engage in a critical review of the practice of the ICTY.
The Taylor Appeals Chamber was quick to note that ‘it is presumed that the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in Peris› ic¤ was only identifying and applying internally
binding precedent’.44 It criticized the Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment for having lim-
ited its analysis ‘to its prior holdings and the holdings of the ICTR Appeals
Chamber, which is the same body’ and for overlooking that the Tadic¤ Appeal
Judgment ‘did not ::: canvas customary international law regarding the elem-
ents for aiding and abetting liability’,45 with its reasoning being instead ‘con-
fined to explaining the differences between aiding and abetting liability and
joint criminal enterprise liability’.46 The Taylor Appeals Chamber also looked
to other ICTY case law. Unlike the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber, the SCSL Appeals
Chamber found that the Mrks› ic¤ and S› ljivanc› anin Judgment had correctly
stated the applicable law when finding that ‘specific direction’ is not an essen-
tial ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.47 It also noted that the
subsequent Lukic¤ and Lukic¤ Appeal Judgment had taken the same approach as
the Mrks› ic¤ and S› ljivanc› anin Appeal Judgment.48 It concluded by stating that
the ‘essential question is whether the acts and conduct of an accused can be
said to have had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime charged’.49
Therefore, even before the S› ainovic¤ Appeal Judgment, the SCSL Appeals
Chamber had concluded that the approach of the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber
was not only unpersuasive, but also flawed.
41 Taylor Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, x 472.
42 Ibid.
43 This interpretation accords with earlier jurisprudence of the SCSL Appeals Chamber, but such
a departure from Art. 20(3) of the SCSL Statute would seem to require ç if that provision is
taken literally ç a higher test than that of the mere lack of ‘persuasiveness’. See in Decision
on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Immediate Protective Measures for Witnesses and Victims and
for non-Public Disclosure, Norman (SCSL-2003-08-PT), 23 May 2003, x 11, in which Judge
Thomson, sitting as single judge, stated: ‘Without meaning to detract from the precedential or
persuasive utility of decisions of the ICTR and the ICTY, it must be emphasized, that the use of
the formula‘‘shall be guided by’’ in Article 20 of the Statute does not mandate a slavish and un-
critical emulation, either precedentially or persuasively, of the principles and doctrines enun-
ciated by our sister tribunals. Such an approach would inhibit the evolutionary
jurisprudential growth of the Special Court consistent with its own distinctive origins and fea-
tures. On the contrary, the Special Court is empowered to develop its own jurisprudence
having regard to some of the unique and different socio-cultural and juridical dynamics pre-
vailing in the locus of the Court.’ See also Decision on Amendment of the Consolidated
Indictment, Norman (SCSL-04-14-AR73), Appeals Chamber, 16 May 2005, x 46.
44 Taylor Appeal Judgment, supra note 6, x 476.
45 Ibid., x 478.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., x 479.
49 Ibid., xx 368, 389, 491.
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It is difficult to imagine that judicial review by the SCSL of the practice of
ICTY is what the drafters of Article 20(3) of the Statute had in mind. On the
face of it, therefore, the attitude of the SCSL favoured fragmentation in that it
countenanced the challenging of precedent that it was supposed to follow,
thus creating uncertainty. At a closer look, however, this argument is not per-
suasive. The approach of the SCSL Appeals Chamber enabled it to maintain
consistency within the practice of the SCSL, which had never relied on the
standard of ‘specific direction’. Moreover, the SCSL Appeals Chamber went on
to demonstrate the coherence of that practice by turning to CIL. Following a
review of the Nuremberg case law, the ICC Statute and other materials, it con-
cluded that ‘the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability’ under both ‘Article
6(1) of the Statute and customary international law’ is satisfied when a given
‘conduct of assistance, encouragement and/or moral support’ has ‘a substantial
effect on the commission of a crime, not when specifically directed to it’.50
By so reasoning, rather than rigidly adhering to Article 20(3) of its Statute,
the SCSL Appeals Chamber was able to confirm the validity of the practice fol-
lowed by the SCSL Chambers and, indirectly, provide a reasonable justification
for Charles Taylor’s conviction notwithstanding the Trial Chamber’s reliance
on a standard lower than that of ‘specific direction’. Moreover, as elaborated in
the following section, the choice of the SCSL Appeals Chamber paved the way
for the two Appeals Chambers of the SCSL and the ICTY to come to a
common and coherent conclusion on the content of the applicable CIL.
5. Halting Fragmentation: the S› ainovic¤ Appeal
Judgment and the Subsequent Jurisprudence
Less than a year later, the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber took an altogether differ-
ent approach from the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber. It found that the approach fol-
lowed in Peris› ic¤ was ‘in direct and material conflict with the prevailing
jurisprudence on the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability and with cus-
tomary international law’.51 It recognized that the ICTY’s case law was neither
united nor consistent, contrary to what the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber had re-
corded. It characterized the case law of the ICTY as divided between, on the
one hand, the ‘Mrks› ic¤ and S› ljivanc› anin and Lukic¤ and Lukic¤ Appeal
Judgements’, which had used the standard of ‘substantial contribution’, and on
the other hand, the Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment, which had employed the stricter
standard of ‘specific direction’.52 It also criticized the Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber
for relying on the ‘flawed premise that the Tadic¤ Appeal Judgement established
a precedent with regard to specific direction’.53 This reliance was erroneous,
said the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber, because the ‘delineation of accessorial
50 Ibid., x 481.
51 Ibid., x1650.
52 S› ainovic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 3, xx1620^1622.
53 Ibid., x1623.
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liability’ made in the Tadic¤ Appeal Judgment only served the purpose of ‘con-
trasting JCE [i.e. joint criminal enterprise] liability with that of aiding and abet-
ting’ and did not amount to ‘a comprehensive statement of aiding and abetting
liability’.54 Furthermore, it underlined that already the C› elebic¤ i Appeal
Judgment (20 February 2001) ç a decision not discussed by the Peris› ic¤
Appeals Chamber ç had ‘explicitly endorsed a definition of aiding and abetting
liability that neither refers to specific direction nor contains equivalent
language’.55
The S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber tackled these discrepancies by relying on a
methodology that the Aleksovski Appeal Judgment had devised more than 10
years earlier.56 In that case, the ICTYAppeals Chamber had, with considerable
foresight, devised a precedential mechanism, under which ç ‘in the interests
of certainty and predictability’ ç decisions rendered by the Appeals Chamber
were binding on Trial Chambers and on future Appeals Chambers,57 although
leaving open the possibility for an Appeals Chamber to depart from a precedent
‘for cogent reasons in the interests of justice’.58 Moreover, it had also outlined
the procedure to be followed by an Appeals Chamber facing divisions within
the jurisprudence of the ICTY.59 In accordance with this mechanism, the
S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber set as its task (i) to ‘determine which decision it
will follow’ in cases of divergences, or (ii) to depart from ‘both decisions for
cogent reasons in the interests of justice’.60 Aptly, the Appeals Chamber re-
marked that this task flowed from ‘its duty to act in the interests of legal cer-
tainty and predictability while ensuring that justice is done in all cases’.61
By doing so, the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber assumed a task that can be con-
sidered akin to that of a ‘Supreme Court’. It took the responsibility of deciding
which of the two views matured in the case law was correct. Most aptly from
the perspective of avoiding fragmentation, the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber justi-
fied its approach in the name of ‘legal certainty and predictability’. In agree-
ment with the Appeals Chamber judgments in the cases Mrks› ic¤ and
S› ljivanc› anin and Lukic¤ and Lukic¤ , and departing from Peris› ic¤ , the S› ainovic¤
Appeals Chamber concluded that ‘specific direction’ was not an element of
aiding and abetting liability.62
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber discussed the content of CIL in the matter of
aiding and abetting to ‘ascertain where the law stands on the issue of specific
direction’63 and to ‘dispel any doubt’ on the subject.64 The Appeals Chamber
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 SeeAleksovski Appeal Judgment, supra note 28, xx 89^114.
57 Ibid., x107.
58 Ibid.
59 x 111 of theAleksovski Appeal Judgment reads: ‘Where, in a case before it, the Appeals Chamber
is faced with previous decisions that are conflicting, it is obliged to determine which decision
it will follow, or whether to depart from both decisions for cogent reasons in the interests of
justice.’
60 S› ainovic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 3, x1622.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., x1649.
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reviewed several post-World War II cases, including (but not limited to) cases
tried by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and under Control
Council Law No. 10,65 concluding that ‘substantial contribution to and know-
ledge of criminal activities were sufficient to establish the mode of liability of
aiding and abetting’.66 It also discussed various international instruments,
such as the ICC Statute, and the practice of the ‘major legal systems of the
world’ by discussing the normative provisions governing aiding and abetting
in numerous national jurisdictions.67
On the basis of this review, which spans several pages of judgment, it set
aside the Peris› ic¤ precedent by concluding that: (i) specific direction ‘is not an es-
sential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting’68; and (ii) the
Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment was ‘in direct and material conflict with the prevailing
jurisprudence on the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability’ as well as ‘with
customary international law in this regard’.69
As noted in Section 1, the subsequent ICTY Appeals Chamber judgments
adhered to the ruling in S› ainovic¤ . One might query whether such adherence
was at the expense of the accused. This issue emerged in the appeal hearing
of the Stanis› ic¤ and Simatovic¤ case. Counsel for Simatovic¤ stated that ‘if the juris-
prudence or the law changed with regard to the interpretation of specific direc-
tion, the interpretation which is the most favourable to him must be applied
in accordance with the principle of the lex mitior’.70 The Appeals Chamber,
however, rejected this argument. For the Appeals Chamber ‘this principle [of
lex mitior] applies to situations where there is a change in the concerned ap-
plicable law’.71 The Appeals Chamber underscored that ‘specific direction has
never been a part of the element of aiding and abetting liability under custom-
ary international law, which the Tribunal has to apply’.72 What the Appeals
Chamber appears to have determined, in effect, was that the standard of ‘spe-
cific direction’ had never been valid law within the ICTY, for it was not part of
the law ‘which the Tribunal has to apply’. If this determination is correct,
then the Appeals Chamber was logically correct in deducing that the principle
of lex mitior would not be applicable as there had not been a change in the ap-
plicable law.
63 Ibid., x1622.
64 Ibid., x1626.
65 Ibid., xx1627^1642.
66 Ibid., xx1628^1640.
67 Ibid., x1643. The Appeals Chamber discussed the legislation and, in some cases, judicial practice
of 32 countries (Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic
Republic of Congo, England, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Luxemburg,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Senegal, Singapore,
South Africa,Tunisia, USA). Ibid., xx1618^1624.
68 Ibid., xx1625^1650.
69 Ibid., x1650.
70 Stanis› ic¤ and Simatovic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 10, x119.
71 Ibid., x128.
72 Ibid.
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The problem with this conclusion is, however, the implication that can be
drawn from it ç namely that Peris› ic¤ was acquitted (and remains so) because
of a law that had never been valid within the ICTY.Yet, the standard of ‘specific
direction’ was formally ‘valid law’ in 2013, even if it later turned out to be le-
gally flawed: the effect of its application was the acquittal of Peris› ic¤ . That
being so, it may be asked whether the lex mitior principle applies not only
when there are changes in the positive law applicable at the time in which a
crime is committed, but also in the presence of jurisprudential developments.
True, both positive law and jurisprudence display normative effects and thus
arguably no distinction may be drawn between the two as concerns the appli-
cation of the principle of lex mitior. However, if the principle of lex mitior
would apply whenever there are changes in the jurisprudence of a given judi-
cial body, it would mean that any prior ruling by a judicial body that is more fa-
vourable to an accused would automatically prevail over any subsequent and
less favourable (to the accused) development. This approach is not convincing.
It would tilt the balance in favour of the accused excessively. It would do so to
the point of divesting the Appeals Chamber of its main function to clarify, in-
terpret, and correct the applicable law, which is essential to the prevention of
fragmentation. This function is not without its limits, however. One such limit
is the principle of finality. It is this principle that ç apart from review proceed-
ings under Article 26 of the ICTY Statute ç precludes disturbing the acquittal
of Peris› ic¤ , even though the law applied to him turned out to be erroneous.73
6. The Role of CIL as an Anti-fragmentation Measure
A distinctive trait of the jurisprudence just examined is that the SCSL and ICTY
Appeals Chambers were able to clarify the applicable law and thus rein in frag-
mentation by adopting a common methodology: they both turned to CIL. The
commonality of the approach employed and the outcome reached by the two
Appeals Chambers reveal the benefit of a methodology that relies on CIL to ex-
trapolate coherent normative approaches by different international courts
operating within the common regime of ICL. In this way, CIL operates as the
common language of international criminal justice. It gives solidity to the nor-
mative solution identified by a judicial bench, and does so in a manner that is
not only constructively open to scrutiny and challenge, but also, if thoroughly
and comprehensively ascertained, potentially authoritative. These consider-
ations suggest that reliance on custom is apt out of respect for the principle of
legality, as a gap-filling measure, and as an anti-fragmentation measure.
73 See, in this regard, S.Vasiliev,‘Consistency of Jurisprudence, Finality of Acquittals, and Ne Bis in
Idem ^ Comments Occasioned by the S› ainovic¤ et al. Appeal Judgment and the OTP Motion for
Reconsideration of the Peris› ic¤ Appeal Judgment’, SSRN, 8 February 2014, 1^16. See also
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration, Peris› ic¤ (IT-04-81-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 March
2014 at 2^3, which makes reference to the principle of finality, albeit in a very succinct way.
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These arguments in support of reliance on CIL must be tested against some-
what sceptical, but by no means peregrine, concerns that have been voiced
about the proper role of CIL within the field of ICL, particularly in recent
years with the coming to prominence of the ICC regime. Albeit raised mainly
in the context of discussing the function of CIL as a source of ICL, such con-
cerns deserve attention also from the perspective of fragmentation.
Particularly with reference to some of the early judgments of the ICTY, it has
been observed that CIL determinations, albeit canvassed in positivist and con-
sequential language, were in fact puzzling as they reflected more the prefer-
ences of the interpreter than the available data, and thus amounted to a sort
of judge-made law in disguise.74
Without entering into the details of this criticism, I would argue that such
criticism would not fit the cases discussed in this article. Quite the opposite,
in fact: it was not the application of CIL, but the disagreement among the
ICTY judges, which had already emerged even before the Peris› ic¤ Appeal
Judgment, that had caused fragmentation. These contradictory approaches
could have also generated confusion within the practice of the SCSL had it
not been for the bold approach taken by its own Appeals Chamber. As the
cases at hand show, CIL ç if correctly and thoroughly ascertained ç does
have a role to play in preventing or reining in fragmentation by curbing the dif-
ferent views, often very strongly held, among judges. CIL requires judges to
search for common approaches and normative solutions emerging internation-
ally or domestically, regardless of their own specific normative preferences.
An early example of reliance on CIL as an anti-fragmentation measure may
be found in the judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Stakic¤ case.75
While adhering to the factual determinations of the Trial Chamber, the
Appeals Chamber departed from the mode of liability (co-perpetratorship)
adopted by the Trial Chamber and replaced it with that of joint criminal enter-
prise. This replacement was neither due to analysis of the merits of each spe-
cific mode of liability, nor to a comparative analysis of their benefits from a
criminal law perspective. It was due to the circumstance that the mode of li-
ability employed by the Trial Chamber in the way it had been ‘defined and
applied by the Trial Chamber’ had no ‘support in customary international law
or in the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal’.76 In fact, the analysis of the
Trial Chamber did not draw on an analysis of the practice of countries belong-
ing to different legal systems (as a finding of CIL would require), but was
74 W. Schabas, Customary Law or ‘‘Judge-Made’’ Law: Judicial Creativity at the UN Criminal Tribunals
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 77^101; J. D’Aspremont and J. de Hemptinne, Droit interna-
tional humanitaire (Pedone, 2012), at 33^35; Y. Ronen, ‘International Humanitarian Law’, in J.
D’Aspremont and J. Kammerhofer (eds), International Legal Positivism in a Post-modern World
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) 488^495.
75 Judgment, Stakic¤ (IT-97-24-A), Appeals Chamber, 22 March 2006, xx 58^63. See in this regard,
van Sliedregt and Vasiliev (eds), supra note 23, at 26.
76 Ibid., x62.
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based mainly on the German scholar Claus Roxin’s well-known theory of co-
perpetration as ‘joint control over the act’.77
Moreover, the ICTY Appeals Chamber pointed out that the mode of liability
used by the Stakic¤ Trial Chamber was not the one ‘under which the Appellant
was charged in the Indictment and to which he responded at trial’.78
Importantly, the same Chamber made clear that ‘the introduction of new
modes of liability could generate uncertainty, if not confusion, in the determin-
ation of the law by the parties to cases before the trial’;79 it was concerned
about ‘ensur[ing] respect for the values of consistency and coherence in the ap-
plication of the law’.80 These passages show that the ICTY Appeals Chamber
had taken seriously the problem of fragmentation. Reliance on CIL, in this in-
stance, limited judicial activism in favour of consistency within the practice of
the ICTY.
A second strand of criticism that has been voiced against reliance on CIL re-
lates to the ‘uncertain nature of the content of customary international law’,
due to it being unwritten law that requires a law-applying authority to ascer-
tain the existence of a given customary rule.81 This criticism is an apt reminder
to avoid over-reliance on CIL, to recognize its limits and to pursue a more codi-
fied ICL, as the Rome Statute has sought to do. It becomes excessive, however,
if it amounts to a plea for the marginalization of CIL unless (and until) a com-
prehensive and widely accepted written instrument is available. CIL remains a
primary source of ICL. This is not only because it is within CIL that one finds
the notion of individual criminal responsibility, the concept of international
crime and the concept of fair trial ç but also because CIL is binding on all
states, including those most hostile towards the ICC. The latter is a fundamen-
tal consideration to be factored in, given that universal ratification of the ICC
Statute is not in sight.
The cases discussed in this article show how CIL can provide sufficiently ac-
curate and precise answers, despite its limits, if the inquiry into its content is
specific and comprehensive enough to lead to objectively verifiable results,82
meaning that the results could be confirmed by an external observer upon a
review of the evidence supporting them. The analysis conducted by the Taylor
Appeals Chamber and even more so by the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber met
these standards.83 The analysis of the S› ainovic¤ Appeals Chamber was not lim-
ited to the Nuremberg jurisprudence, or to the practice of a few countries. It
amounted to a copious analysis ç perhaps unprecedented in the practice of
the ICTY ç of numerous judicial decisions and the legislation and practice of
a large number of states belonging to different legal traditions, and it openly
77 Judgment, Stakic¤ (IT-97-24-T),Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003, xx 431^442.
78 Stakic¤ Appeal Judgment, supra note 75, x62.
79 Ibid., x59.
80 Ibid.
81 Jacobs, supra note 15, 33.
82 See, generally, Y. Kirakosyan, ‘Finding Custom: The ICJ and the International Criminal Courts
and Tribunals Compared’, in Stahn and van den Herik (eds), supra note 22, at 154^161.
83 Sadat, supra note 12, at 485.
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discussed the findings over several pages of judgment.84 Therefore, rather than
reflecting judges’ normative preferences as to what the content of the law
should be, that analysis offers plenty of externally verifiable examples as to
what the practice of states is. In this way, the ICTY Appeals Chamber showed
that the role CIL can play within the field of ICL is directly proportional to the
thoroughness of the analysis of its content. The utility and persuasiveness of
the analysis increases when, as in S› ainovic¤ , the search for the applicable law
covers and benefits from the experiences gained by domestic jurisdictions be-
longing to different legal traditions. That said, it should be also recognized
that in some cases CIL may be inadequate insofar as it does not provide a
clear answer to relevant issues. In such instances, the application of other
sources of ICL (in particular treaty law and general principles of law) should
be required and turned to without hesitation.
In light of these considerations, two distinct but connected questions arise
concerning the relationship between the ICC regime and fragmentation. The
first is whether CIL can be an anti-fragmentation measure within the ICC
regime. The second is if the ‘ICC Judges should align their jurisprudence with
customary international law to avoid the fragmentation of international crim-
inal law and its decreased legitimacy’, as suggested by Leyla Sadat and Jarod
Jolly.85 Some thoughts on this latter question are proffered in the concluding
section of this article.
As to the first of these questions, the process of applying CIL in ICC cases is
directed, framed and limited by Article 21 and other norms of the ICC Statute
such as Article 22.86 The unspoken purpose of Article 21 is to subordinate judi-
cial discretion through a clear and predictable framework, in order to reduce
instances of judicial law making.87 While clearly giving primacy to the norms
written into the Statute, however, Article 21 did not create a self-contained
regime.88 It enables the subsidiary application of sources of ICL external to the
Statute, which includes CIL.89 The cases discussed in this article offer some
84 Ibid.
85 L.N. Sadat and J.M. Jarrod, ‘Seven Canons of ICC Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article
25’s Rorschach Blot’, 27 LJIL (2014) 755, at 761.
86 For a detailed analysis of Art. 21’s content and role, see G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy of
Sources of Law before the ICC’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International
Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 2015) 411.
87 See, in this regard, J. Powderly, ‘The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the
Interpretative Judicial Function: Reflections on the Sources of Law and Interpretative
Technique’, in Stahn (ed.), ibid., 444, at 445^454.
88 A. Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds),The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002) 1053^1056; D. Hunt, ‘The International
Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in
International Judges’, 2 JICJ (2004) 56, at 69; L. Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental
Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court’, 21 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) (2010) 543.
89 See, among others, L.N. Sadat,‘Custom, Codification and SomeThoughts about the Relationship
Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute’, 49 DePaul Law Review (2000) 909, at 918; W.
Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford
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‘food for thought’on the possibility of using CIL as an anti-fragmentation meas-
ure within the ICC framework.
To begin with, the number of criticisms and perplexities that have arisen in
respect to the fragmented ICTY jurisprudence is a reminder of how fragmenta-
tion, far from being a matter of mere academic interest, can damage the repu-
tation of a judicial institution. The vocabulary of fragmentation is a valuable
indicator that the practice of a given court or tribunal may lose clarity in its
sense of direction and ultimately credibility. CIL is only one way to address
fragmentation ç other sources, depending on the issues, can contribute as
well. Yet the importance of CIL as an anti-fragmentation measure cannot be
overlooked. If correctly ascertained and interpreted, CIL necessitates the find-
ing of normative solutions that have widespread acceptance and thus are less
likely to fragment into streams of different views. Such ascertainment hinges
on the identification of a correct and common methodology among different
Chambers (and judges), a problem the ad hoc tribunals have struggled with
for years. The cases at hand highlight the need for identifying a correct, non-
superficial methodology to assess the content of ICL so as to arrive at credible
determinations that can withstand critical scrutiny. Accurate and abundantly
reasoned determinations of CIL, far from being judge-made law in disguise,
help ensure a consistent and persuasive development of the applied law
among different Chambers and across ICL.90
7. Concluding Thoughts
This article has argued that the vocabulary and metaphor of fragmentation is a
useful tool in the field of ICL. It brings necessary attention to processes that
render the applicable law unclear for the actors operating within it.
Fragmentation happens when legal norms are blurred or applied in a contra-
dictory manner, often because of a lack of agreement among the judges called
to interpret and define its content. Processes of fragmentation affect not only
unitary systems, but also a pluralist regime such as ICL. Fragmentation pro-
cesses unsettle the law applied by a given court or tribunal and undo processes
of harmonization (such as the forming of a settled jurisprudence) across the
various units that compose ICL. True, ‘fragmentation’ is not necessarily a path-
ology. It may also be an avenue for transformation, paving the way for change
and improvement in the jurisprudence of a given court or across courts. It is
for the international judges to strike the appropriate balance between the con-
cern for change and also justice in a specific case, with the overall need for
University Press, 2010), at 391; G. Hochmayr, ‘Applicable Law in Practice and Theory:
Interpreting Article 21 of the ICC Statute’, 12 JICJ (2014) 665, at 668^679.
90 On the role of custom as an aid to interpretation of the elements of crimes contained in the ICC
Statute, see L. Grover, Interpreting Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 220^320.
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the jurisprudence of a given court, and more generally of ICL, to be reasonably
clear and predictable.
Certainly, expecting full clarity and predictability in the applicable law is un-
realistic as interpretation is a human activity, not a mechanic enterprise. It is
not unrealistic, however, to expect judges to fulfil the duty stemming from the
judicial function to administer the law in a way that makes it useful ç to
make it as harmonious as reasonably possible rather than fragmented. Far
from being neutral actors, international judges have an important role in pro-
moting stability and predictability within the jurisprudence of their own insti-
tutions and, when necessary, within ICL. They should strive to do so. No
court of law can maintain authority as a finder and shaper of the content of
the applicable law if such content changes randomly and quickly.
Formalistic adherence to precedent is not useful in this respect as it may
prompt fragmentation. The Peris› ic¤ Appeals Chamber failed in this regard. The
SCSL Appeals Chamber did not. Had the SCSL Appeals Chamber followed
Article 20(3) of its Statute literally and thus adhered to the Peris› ic¤ precedent,
the jurisprudence of the SCSL would have been rather contradictory to the
eventual jurisprudence of the other tribunals. It would have been in conflict
with the subsequent ICTYcase law (S› ainovic¤ ), thus adding to the lack of clarity
as to the content of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability. This circum-
stance alerts us to the limits of normative formulations requiring a court to
be guided by the precedent set by another court, even if it considers that exter-
nal precedent to have been wrongly decided. This does not mean that a norm
of coordination, such as Article 20(3) of the SCSL Statute, should not be in-
serted again into the text of the Statute of a future ad hoc court or tribunal. It
is suggested that the rigour of these kinds of norms ç which are unquestion-
ably useful from the perspective of preventing fragmentation ç should leave
open the possibility of departing from an otherwise controlling precedent in
the ‘interests of justice’, subject of course to the provision of cogent reasons as
to why departure is necessary.
Finally, yet importantly, reliance by the ICTYon CIL as an anti-fragmentation
measure highlights the crucial problem (from the perspective of fragmentation)
of the relationship between the two normative strands that are gradually con-
solidating within the field of ICL. One strand is anchored in CIL (at least as it
stood at the time of the commission of the crimes over which jurisdiction is
exercised), while the other is developing based on the application and interpret-
ation of the ICC Statute irrespectively of CIL. This phenomenon may be worri-
some because the presence of these two strands makes it difficult to gauge the
content of contemporary customary ICL by all those required to apply and
obey it, beginning with the judges sitting in domestic jurisdictions and states
involved in hostilities.
On one hand, there appears to be a consolidation of an ICL built primarily on
CIL, as identified and interpreted through the case law of the ad hoc tribunals
and hybrid tribunals. The fact that those tribunals and courts may soon cease
to exist, or as in the case of the SCSL have already done so, is of limited rele-
vance. Their copious jurisprudence will survive them. Domestic jurisdictions
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required to apply customary ICL ç international crimes divisions established
within national jurisdictions, and future ad hoc courts or tribunals (and the
ICC itself) ç may naturally turn to that jurisprudence for reference and guid-
ance given its quantity, its accessibility and its efforts to adhere to and build
upon internationally recognized standards. ICL may thus remain a substan-
tially pluralist regime, even if international criminal justice might have in the
near future only one international actor. The peculiarity of that jurisprudence,
and its limit, is that it applied CIL only as it stood at the time in which the
crimes were committed (1992^1995 as concerns the ICTY) and thus it should
not be applied automatically to current cases. Therefore, it falls on all courts
required to apply customary ICL to ascertain how subsequent developments
in the practice of states, beginning with the adoption of the ICC Statute, have
affected its content.
On the other hand, the ICC, albeit a permanent international court having
the ‘potential to reach ICL offenses committed anywhere in the world’,91 and
not an ad hoc court, seems to place limited value in adhering to and setting
standards of universal acceptance and application ç the distinctive feature of
the gallant case law of the ad hoc tribunals. The impression one receives from
reading the growing practice of the ICC is that this court is adopting a rather
inward-looking attitude rather than a universalistic one.92 This inward-looking
attitude carries the risk of having judges concerned with reading (or over-
reading) into the ICC Statute their own normative preferences rather than sub-
jecting them to international scrutiny via Article 21 of the Statute. It is
almost as if the ICC is trying to set its own standards as to what the content
of ICL should be. In so doing, however, it behaves more as a multinational (as
opposed to international) court responding ç through quite close adherence
to the ICC Statute ç only to the states that drafted its Statute (and their nor-
mative preferences), instead of seeking validation from those that are not
party to it and more generally from the whole international community. True,
on the face of it, there is nothing wrong with the cautious approach followed
by the ICC judges.93 And yet, if the ‘ICC is not just an agent of its parties’,94
then the approach emerging in the ICC jurisprudence ought to be mulled over
more in depth than it has been done so far, with consideration given to the
91 Ibid., at 1079.
92 In her ‘Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van denWyngaert’, appended to Judgment pur-
suant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12), Trial Chamber, 18 December
2012, x5, Judge Van der Wyngaert stated: ‘The control over the crime theory is primarily based
on German legal doctrine and on the writings of Claus Roxin. I agree with Judge Fulford that
this direct import from the German legal system is problematic. Considering its universalist mis-
sion, the Court should refrain from relying on particular national models, however sophisticated
they may be.’ (Emphasis added.) See also ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford’ attached to
Judgment pursuant to Art. 74, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber, 14 March
2012, xx 8^10.
93 See, generally, V. Nerlich, ‘The Role of the Appeals Chamber’, in Stahn (ed.), supra note 86,
963^980.
94 See also R. Cryer, ‘Royalism and The King: Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Politics of
Sources’, 12 New Criminal Law Review (2009) 390, at 394.
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role the ICC seeks for itself within the international community. Arguably, one
of the possible risks associated with this trend is that the ICC may lose ‘gravita-
tional pull’ towards non-party states. Those states may feel less inclined to
submit their territory and citizens to the jurisdiction of an institution that
speaks a ‘different language’and is keen to continue doing so.
Overall, my concern is that unless the ICC Statute succeeds in establishing
itself as a new code of ICL by receiving a higher number of ratifications by
states, which could render the law applied by the ICC a sort of new customary
ICL, ICL may find itself divided into two parallel normative strands.95 This div-
ision, even if one takes it as the unavoidable feature of a pluralist ICL, carries
the negative consequence of making it more difficult to grasp the content of
ICL by those called to apply it and obey it, beginning with national jurisdic-
tions. It also makes it more difficult to impose and justify the systematic pros-
ecution of international crimes relying on the authority of ICL as the law of
the international community of states as a whole.96
95 For some pertinent observations in this regard, see A.K.A. Greenwalt, ‘The Pluralism of
International Criminal Law’, 86 Indiana Law Journal (2011) 1080^1813. Antonio Cassese ex-
pressed a similar concern in respect of the ICCSt. when stating that ‘Thus, the Statute itself
seems to postulate the future existence of two possible regimes or corpora of international criminal
law, one established by the Statue and the other laid down in general international criminal
law.’ A. Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections’, 10 EJIL (1999) 144, at 157.
96 With foresight, James Stewart has suggested that ‘instead of continuing to embrace the radical
doctrinal heterogeneity that, in large part, produces the disarray in modes of participation for
international crimes, we should promulgate a universal set of standards that resolves these
issues once and for all.We have treaties for international crimes such as genocide, war crimes,
and soon crimes against humanity, but not for forms of participation in these crimes that
very much colour what it means to be responsible for an international offence.’ J.G. Stewart,
‘Ten Reasons for Adopting a Universal Concept of Participation in Atrocity’, in van Sliedregt
and Vasiliev (eds), supra note 23, at 321.
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